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ABSTRACT
Standard explanations of the bivariate correlation ofmoney and income
attribute this correlation to an inability of agents to discriminate in the
short run between real and nominal sources of price shocks. Thispaper is an
empirical comparison of the standard explanation with two alternatives: 1) the
"credit view", which focuses on financial market imperfections rather than
real—nominal confusion; and 2) the real business cycle approach, whichargues
that the money—income correlation reflects a passiveresponse of money to
income. The methodology, which is a variant of the Sims VAR approach, follows
Blanchard and Watson (1984) in using an estimated, explicitly structural model
to orthogonalize the VAR residuals. (This variant methodology, Iargue, is the
more appropriate for structural hypothesis testing.) The results suggest that
the standard explanations of the money—income relation are largely, but perhaps




Princeton, NJ 08544I. Introduction
By now it should be unnecessary to motivate a study of the statistical
correlation between the money stock and national income. At leastsince the
work of Friedman and Schwartz (1963), this stylized fact has beenconsidered
among the most important in macroeconomics; at times, its explication has
nearly defined the field.
Not too long ago it appeared that there was a developingconsensus about
the source of this correlation. Lucas (1972) and his followers,on the one
hand, and the contract theorists (Fischer (1977), Gray (1978), Taylor (1980)),
on the other, developed models which have, conceptually, quite different
starting points; yet, operationally, the two approaches have much in common.
Both models ascribe the money-income correlation to an inability ofagents to
discriminate perfectly in the short run between real and nominal sources of
price shocks. The two approaches agree that the magnitude of the money-income
correlation depends on the relative sizes of the two types of shocks, and both
deny that the authorities have the capacity to exploit this correlation to keep
output persistently above its natural level.(The contract theorists do differ
from the Lucas school in sometimes advocating activist monetary policy in the
short run.)
Recently, however, some alternative explanations of the money-income
relationship have emerged (or, more accurately, have been revived, since
antecedents abound). I consider two of these in the present paper. The first
approach, the "credit view", focuses on financial market imperfections rather
than real-nominal confusion as the source of the correlation. Shocks to credit
markets, whether due to monetary policy or some other source, have (it is
argued) effects on real output; since money and credit move together, this
shows up as a relation between output and money.-2—
The second approach, the "real business cycle view," takes the position
that money is passive, and that it is correlated with output onlybecause
agents increase their demand for transactionsservices when output or expected
future output is high. Advocates of this position can point to recent findings
that the money-income correlation is largely a correlation between incomeand
inside money, rather than the base; and that the money-income correlation is
greatly reduced when nominal interest rates (which presumablycontain
information about future output) are controlled for.
To explore these alternative explanations, I use a variant of the Sims
(1980a) vector autoregression methodology. This variant differs from the usual
VAR approach in the way that it orthogonalizes the estimated VAR residuals into
the "true" underlying structural disturbances: Instead of extracting the
disturbances via the standard Choleski decomposition (a procedure sometimes
treated as neutral, but which in fact embodies strong assumptions about the
underlying economic structure), the method used here calculates the
disturbances by inverting an estimated, explicitly structural model of the
relation among the contemporaneous VAR residuals. This alternative
methodology, I argue, is more appropriate to use when attempting to
discriminate among structural hypotheses.
The results that I get tend more to the eclectic than the monistic.I
present some evidence against recent claims that credit has no role, given
money; for the claim that money has no role, given interest rates, I obtain
mixed results. It seems appropriate to conclude that the traditional view of
the money-income correlation is significantly, but probably riot completely,
displaced by the alternative theories.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses the
alternative VAR methodology. Section III considers the "credit view" as an—3-
explanation of the money-income correlation. SectionIV examines the real
business cycle explanation. Section V concludes.
II. Methodology
As will be discussed in more detail in theapplications below, much of the
new evidence recently advanced on the sources of themoney-income correlation
has been obtained by the Sims VARmethodology (see particularly Sims (1980b),
S. King (1982), 1984), and Litterman and Weiss(1985)). In this paper I will
be as concerned with evaluating theserecent findings as with presenting
additional results; in particular, I am interestedin clarifying what, if
anything, can be learned about structural hypotheses from theanalysis of
reduced-form VARs. To facilitate this, this sectiondevelops a VAR-type
methodology which is similar in form to the standardapproach but which admits
a more explicitly structural interpretation. Acomparison of this methodology
with the standard approach raises questions about thevalue of the latter for
structural interpretation of the data. In subsequentsections I also show, by
comparing empirical results from the two approaches, that thesequestions are
of great practical importance.
The alternative VAR methodology presented here isclosely related to an
approach developed by Blanchard and Watson (1984). Following theirexposition,
let us suppose that is an n x I vector of macroeconomic variables, observed
at time t, whose joint behavior we wish to study.(The dimensionality of Y is
typically small: Blanchard and Watson consider a system of four variables. In-4-
the two applications of the present paper, n =6.)Assume that the dynamic
behavior of is governed by the followingstructural1 model:
2
(2.1) Y = B.Y .÷Au
t 1 t-i t
i=O
where Ut, which I will call the vector of "structuraldisturbances', is
serially uncorrelated2 and E(uu) =, adiagonal matrix. In the language of
business cycle analysis, the u's are the "impulses" and theB's capture the
"propagation mechanism" of the economy. (2.1) generalizesBlanchard and
Watson's equation (1) by allowing A is an n x n non-singular matrix whose
diagonal elements are normalized to equal one but which mayhave arbitrary
off-diagonal elements.
Writing the stochastic component of (2.1) as Au, underthe assumptions
made, imposes no restrictions relative to the usual Cowlesformulation that
takes A1 and allows the contemporaneous covariance matrix of the u's tobe
arbitrary.I have chosen the less familiar representation in order to convey a
somewhat different interpretation than the usual of the nature of theu's and
of the sources of correlation between structural equations: Specifically,I
1 In this paper I use "structural" in the traditional sense of
"motivated by an explicit economic theory" rather than in the more
modern usage, "invariant with respect to a specified class of
interventions." Thus the models I will estimate are vulnerable to
the Lucas critique. Note, however, that I do not use my results to
make conditional forecasts, but only to assess the relative
importance of certain types of shocks during a given sample period;
the latter is a valid application. I thank Lars Hansen and Frederic
Mishkin for raising this point.
2 Serial correlation of u could be handled by standard methods. I
rule this out here only so that the alternative methodology given
here will be more directly comparable to the conventional VAR
approach.-5- N>
want to think of the U'sin(2.1) as "primitive"exogenous forces,not directly
observed by the econometricianwhich buffet the system andcause oscillations.
Because these shocks are
primitive, i.e., they do not havecommon causes, it is
natural to treat them as
approximately uncorrelated (1 diagonal).However, one
would not want to restrictindividual u's to enteringone and only one
structural equation, ingeneral; thus the matrix A is allowed tohave arbitrary
off-diagonal elements. Under this
interpretation, then, the stochasticparts
of individual structuralequations are allowed to be
contemporaneously
correlated in an arbitrary
way; however, the correlation betweenany two
equations arises explicitly because theequations are influenced by oneor more
of the same fundamental shocks
As an example, one element of
u might represent supply conditions in the
world oil industry. Thisexogenous influence on a given nationaleconomy
should be at least
approximately uncorrelated with other fundamental
macroeconomic influences, such as thepace of domestic technical or financial
innovation, or the random components of
monetary and fiscal policy. Thus I is
diagonal. However, oil supply conditionsmight well affect a number of
different structural equations
(e.g., both aggregate supply andaggregate
demand). Thus in this case A hasoff-diagonal elements and the stochastic
components of different structural equationsare correlated.
Note that, in taking A to ben x n, I am assuming that the number of
observed macro variables Y and thenumber of unobserved fundamental
shocks u are the same. Tk5 isnot as restrictive as itappears: First, iitheobserved macro variables areindependent in the
sample, then (2.1) implies that there must beat least as many
independent shocks as observed variables.(Some of the shocks might
only be measurement errors.) If the number offundamental shocks
exceeds the number of observedvariables, then the independent
influences of all of these shockscannot be identified. However, it
will always be possible in thiscase to pick n independent shock
series and an associated A matrix whichimply observational
equivalence with the true structure.-6-
This discussion suggests a potentially
valuable payoff to estimating the
model (2.1): Given the estimated parameters,
(2.1) can be used to obtain time
series of estimated fundamental
disturbances u. Since this model is supposed
to be structural, it should be possibleto give these estimated shocks fairly
specific economic interpretations(e.g. ,asshocks to aggregate demand,
aggregate supply, or to policyreaction functions). As do Blanchardand Watson
in their paper, one could then study(1) the occurrence of specific individual
shocks (as an aid to interpreting economichistory), (2) the joint empirical
distribution of the shocks (in order to examine moregeneral hypotheses about
the sources of cycles), and (3) the dynamic responseof observed macro
variables to a representative shock of a given type.
A problem is that (2.1) has potentially a great manyunknown parameters.
Blanchard and Watson note that a computational simplificationin estimating
(2.1) is achieved if we impose no restrictions onthe B. for i0 (except for
specifying the maximum lag length) andconcentrate on modelling contemporaneous
relationships.4 In this case a reduced form relating Y to its laggedvalues
can be written
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For the models estimated by Blanchard-Watson andin this paper, it
seems reasonable to impose no restrictions on lagstructures. This
is also what is done in the standard VAR approach.One can imagine
models based on dynamic economic theories, however,for which
restrictions on lags would provide important identifying power.-7—
where I now write simply B instead of B. Onceestimated ys are obtained from
a first-stage, unrestricted estimation of (2.2), onemay attempt to identify
and estimate the purely contemporaneous structuralmodel given by (2.3).
Before discussing the details of how (2.3) isestimated, it will be useful
to consider the relation of the foregoing to coventional VARanalysis.
The interpretation of VARs.6 The value of Sims'(1972, 1980a) VAR
methodology for forecasting, or for providing an atheoretical characterization
of patterns in the data (such as might also be givenby estimated spectra, or
by Burns—Mitchell reference cycles) is uncontroversial. Much less clear is the
ability of unrestricted VARs to aid in discriminatingamong structural
hypotheses about the economy. Nevertheless, many recent studiesappear to be
operating on the premise that the calculation of Granger-causalitytests,
variance decomposition tables, and impulseresponse functions is helpful for
distinguishing true theories from false ones. It is useful to reconsider this
premise for the case in which (2.1) describes the true structure. Since the
question of what can be inferred from a finding of Granger causality has been
extensively debated (see, e.g., Zellner (1979) and Leamer (1985)), I
concentrate on the interpretation of estimated variance decompositions and
impulse response (IR) functions within this framework. However, it should be
In this paper I estimate (2.2) as a standard vector autoregression.
Because of a difference in focus, Blanchard and Watson estimate
(2.2) by a method that reduces the weight given to outliers.
6
Everything in the subsection below is at least implicit in the
Blanchard-Watson paper, but I believe that an expanded discussion
and further emphasis are warranted. See Gordon and King (1982) for
a good related analysis. Also, after writing this paper I became
aware of work by Cooley and LeRoy (1985), which gives a very nice
presentation of a number of similar points.-8—
clear that the interpretation of Granger—causality tests is alsoaffected by
the considerations discussedbelow.7
Let us review some basics of how variance decompositions and IR functions
are calculated. The first step is relatively innocuous; it is simplythe
estimation of a VAR (like (2.2)) and the obtaining of residuals (the y, in our
notation). However, the more troublesome next step (required to construct
unambiguous variance decompositions or IR functions) is to decompose the y's
into n orthogonal time series. There is perhaps no one correct way to do this.
However, since these new orthogonal series are treated as being economically
meaningful by proponents of the standard VAR methodology, I would argue that
what is really wanted are the U's from equation (2.3). To obtain estimates of
these u's, it appears necessary to use the relevant econometric theory to
identify and estimate the model (2.3). This of course requires a commitment to
a specific structural model (or, perhaps, to a class of models).
Practitioners of the standard VAR approach do not use the explicitly
structural method just described to orthogonalize the VAR residuals, presumably
because of the view of Sims (1980a) that a sufficient number of credible
identifying restrictions are not typically available. But does the standard
VAR approach in some way achieve a meaningful decomposition of the y's without
assuming a specific structural model? The answer is no: Indeed, the
conventional method of orthogonalization (based on the Choleski decomposition)
is equivalent to assuming a model of the form of (2.3) in which A1 and, for a
specified ordering of the variables, B is a lower-triangular matrix of
projection coefficients. This achieves orthogonalization of the residuals, but
it also has the effect of assuming that the structural model for y is of a
See Cooley and LeRoy (1985) for a relevant discussion.-9—
particular form, i.e., strictly recursive-—an assumption whichis usually not
motivated by the relevant economic theory. The essentialarbitrariness of the
conventional approach is not helped by the usual practice oftrying alternative
orderings of the y's: This still restricts attention to recursivemodels,
which (roughly speaking) occupy a set of measurezero within the set of models
described by (2.3).
If it is not believed that the true economic model isrecursive, then the
orthogonal "shock" series obtained by the conventional approach haveno
particular meaning. This outweighs what otherwise would be attractive
arguments that a standardized method of orthogonalization reduces investigator
discretion and thus the scope for "data-mining." Thereseems to be no
alternative, if one wishes to interpret calculated variance decompositions and
IR functions as giving evidence about the structure of theeconomy, to
identifying and estimating explicitly structural models of the form (2.3) and
then using the associated u's as the orthogonal decomposition of they's. In
the next sub-section I discuss how models of the form (2.3)may be estimated;
in the empirical applications below I demonstrate thatorthogonalization via an
estimated model, rather than by an assumed recursivestructure, can have a
significant effect on the inferences drawn from a VAR-based analysis.
Estimation of (2.3). Given that the vector of residuals has been
obtained from a first-stage VAR, the problem of interest is how to estimate the
system of equations (2.3). This system of equations may usefully be thought of
Of course, assuming a recursive model for y is defensible if one
actually believes that the structure (2.3) is recursive. However,
the practice of trying different orderings is consistent only if the
investigator believes the system to be recursive but does not know
the causal sequence. This is a very strange sort of prior.—10-
as a latent variables model; it is closely related to factor models and index
models. In the macro literature, models of this form have been estimated by R.
Hall (1978), Hall and Mishkin (1982), Bernanke (1983a, 1984) and no doubt by
others. (For an estimated macroeconomic index model, see Sargent and Sims
(1977).) All of the papers above estimate lagged as well as contemporaneous
relationships, and there is no reason in principle why prior restrictions on
the lag structure could not be incorporated into the present analysis (e.g.,
they could take the form of restrictions on (2.1) and (2.2)). However, as
noted above, prior restrictions on the lag structures seem relatively less
credible for the models estimated here, and I do not employ them.
Although overidentified models of the form of (2.3) can be estimated by
maximum likelihood methods (see B. Hall (1979)), in this paper I consider only
just-identified models, for three reasons: First, I will show that
just-identified versions of (2.3) can be estimated by a simple and well-known
method which is computationally much less onerous than general maximum
likelihood with overidentifying restrictions (give the number of unknown
parameters typically involved in systems of any size). Second, overidentified
models will not in general yield perfectly orthogonal u's, so that the problem
of how to order variables in variance decompositions and IR functions
re-emerges (albeit in a relatively minor way, since if the overidentifying
restrictions are not rejected, the departure from orthogonality is small).
Third, in practice one rarely enjoys the luxury of having many substantive
overidentifying restrictions; indeed, some of the assumptions needed to
identify are typically "auxiliary" assumptions, in that they are not strongly
implied by the basic theory.(For example, it may be assumed that the
disturbances associated with certain structural equations are uncorrelated.)—11—
The use of just-identified models in practice thus tendsto minimize the number
of auxiliary assumptions employed.
The model in Blanchard Watson is just-identified (given that two
parameters are estimated using information from outside the data set), but it
also contains two special features: 1) The assumption that disturbancesto the
model's equations are uncorrelated cannot be relaxed (A1 in (2.3)).2) The
model is "quasi-triangular"; i.e., the equations can be ordered in sucha way
that each equation i has exactly i-i unknown parameters.9 These two features
allow the Blanchard-Watson model to be estimated by sequentialapplication of
two-stage least-squares, where the instruments for the i-th equation are the
estimated residuals from equations 1 through i-i.
I avoid imposing these special features by estimating using the method of
moments; that is, I equate the population moments implied by the theory with
the sample moments of y (where, again, y is the vector of VAR residuals). From
(2.3) it follows that
(2.4) uu =A1(I_B)yt4(I_B)'(AHI
Let N = bethe sample covariance matrix of y.
Then averaging (2.4) over the sample and equating population moments and sample
moments yields
(2.5) i =
where(2.5) now defines the estimates V =(A,B, i), if the system is
identified.
Note that recursive systems are quasi-triangular systems, but not
vice versa.—12—
The individual parameters (the non-zero elements of 1) will generally be
identifiable under two conditions: First, the number of estimated parameters
must not exceed the number of distinct covariances in H (an ordercondition).'°
The number of distinct covariances is n(n+1)/2; thus, in the (6x6) models
estimated below I am able to identify 21 parameters--the 6 diagonal elements of
and 15 nonzero elements of A and B. The second condition is that the system
of nonlinear equations given by (2.5) have at least one solution. This may
fail: For example consider the model specification in which it is assumed that
the i-th and j-th row of B contain only zeros, for some distinctand j, and
that non-diagonal elements of the i-th and j-th rows of A are also zero. Then
there are no possible parameter values which yield a non-zero population
covariance for the i—th and j—th elements of y; this prohibits a solution if
the corresponding sample covariance is non-zero.I think of this second
condition as a rank condition, since if the matrix of partial derivatives of
the distinct population covariances with respect to unknown parameters is
everywhere of full rank, a solution can be typically obtained.
If all parameters are identified, the estimates are obtainable numerically
in two steps:1) To find the n(n-1)/2 non-zero parameters of A and B, first
set all below-the-diagonal elements of the symmetric matrix on the
right-hand-side of (2.5) equal to zero.(Recall that I is constrained to be a
diagonal matrix.) This yields a system of n(n-1)/2 simultaneous equations in
the same number of unknown parameters of A and B. This system is typically
well-behaved and is easily solved. 2) Given the elements of A and B, read off
the estimated non-zero values of I from the diagonal of the matrix on the
right-hand-side of (2.5). This process is computationally very easy: Model
10
In the just-identified case the number of estimated parameters
exactly equals the number of distinct elements of N.-13—
estimatespresented in this paper were obtained in anaverage (per
specification) of less than one minute of computing timeon a personal
computer.
This estimation procedure is numerically identicalto Blanchard and
Watson's sequential 2SLS procedure, for thecases where that procedure is
applicable. The estimates are consistent no matter whatdistributional
assumptions are made (as long as all the relevant momentsexist); if an
assumption of normality of the structural disturbances u is added to the
maintained assumption of just-identification, the method-of-moments(HOFf)
estimates are also numerically identical to the maximum likelihoodestimates
(see B. Hall (1979)). Indeed, because thefirst-stage VAR is also an MOM
estimator, and because we are considering only just—identifiedmodels, the
previous statement applies to the full two-stage estimation procedure
(including the estimation of (2.2)), as well as to the estimation of(2.3)
considered in isolation. That is, the parameter estimates obtainedby the
two-stage procedure are identical to those one would get by applying FINL to
the original model (2.1).
I estimated standard errors of the parameters in twoways. First, I
calculated the appropriate asymptotic sampling error of the covariancematrix
of VAR residuals, H, by methods described in Anderson (1958),chapter 8.Since
the parameter estimates are functions of H, their approximate standarderrors
could be computed directly from the standard errors of the elements of H viaa
linearization. Second, I estimated standard errors by inverting the
information matrix of the maximum likelihood problem associated with (2.3) for
the case where the u's are independent normals. The first of these methods
explicitly takes into account the two-stage nature of the estimation (i.e., the
standard errors obtained should be approximately equal to those derived by—14-
applying PINt to (2.1)), while the second method treats (2.3) asthe basic
estimation problem and ignores the first-stage VAR. For this reason,
t-statistics derived by the first method are reported below. However, standard
errors obtained by the two methods differed only very slightly.
Given estimates A, B, and ,andthe model (2.3), one can construct
structually interpretable decompositions of the VAR residuals into orthogonal
shocks. The implications of.this for the interpretation of VARs are developed
in the two applications below.
III. Honey versus Credit
In this section I take up the first of the two alternative explanations
for the money-income correlation; namely, that this correlation is in some
sense "really" a correlation between income and credit (at least in part) so
that the strong bivariate correlation of money and output reflects primarily
the collinearity of money and credit.11 Some empirical evidence for the credit
view (where credit is defined very broadly) has been offered in various places
by Benjamin Friedman (see e.g., Friedman (1983)). Counter—evidence is given in
an interesting paper by Stephen King (1984); I will return to the King paper
below.
To anticipate a bit the next section's discussion of real business cycles:
A possible view of the money-versus-credit issue is that it is unimportant,
because both money and credit are purely endogenous, not causal variables. A
clear recent statement of this may be found in R. King and Plosser (1984): In
the King-Plosser model, financial services (transactions, borrowing) are inputs
The notion that the money-income correlation is in fact due to the
relation of some omitted third variable to both money and income
arises again when we consider the real business cycle hypothesis,
below.-15-
into the production process; as with any normal input, financial servicesare
used more heavily when output is high or is expected to be high. In this
framework, financial aggregates such as money and credit appear to lead output
(or to be contemporaneously correlated with output) because theseaggregates
mirror the level of financial services; however, the financialaggregates are
purely passive responders to movements in current output and expected future
output. Roughly, money and credit appear at the bottom of a block-recursive
12
system.
If money and credit are passive tails on the output dog, then the issue of
money—versus-credit is of little practical importance, except perhaps for
forecasters. Is the real business cycle view plausible? It does seem likely
to me that on average, much if not most of the relation of income and the
financial aggregates might be due to endogeneity of the aggregates.(This
turns out to be important for interpreting the empirical results below.)
However, for purposes (say) of policy analysis, there is a big difference
between complete and almost-but-not-quite-complete endogeneity of the financial
aggregates, since it is in those occasional circumstances when the direction of
causality runs from financial aggregates to output that correct policy choice
is most important. Thus, while acknowledging that money and credit are
probably often passive, I shall proceed to consider the possibility that these
variables may sometimes take an active, causal role.
Some currently standard explanations of how monetary shocks can have real
effects were mentioned in the introduction. Analyses of the macroeconomic
12
Here and in the rest of this section I frequently slip into talking
about the money-income correlation as pertaining to real, as opposed
to nominal, money (or credit). A positive relation between output
and real money implies a similar relation between output and nominal
money if prices are not too countercyclical. See King and Plosser
for an extended discussion of this point.—16-
effects of credit shocks are contained in Blinder (1983), Bernanke and Gertler
(1985), and others; for a particularly clear and simple discussion, see Blinder
and Stiglitz (l983).13 Without going into detail, I will here state and
discuss briefly some basic features of the canonical credit—causes-output
story. For theoretical reasons (see below), by !Icreditt! I will mean
specifically customer loans granted by intermediaries, not bonds or other
auction-market instruments, despite Friedman1s results that broader measures of
credit track output more closely.
The argument for credit appears to have two major and two auxiliary
premises. The two major premises are:
1) Some assets of financial intermediaries (specifically, their customer
loans) are imperfect substitutes for non—intermediary assets; in particular,
only intermediaries are willing to hold the liabilities of certain borrowers.
2) There are shocks which affect the cost and availability of funds to
financial intermediaries; there are also shocks to the cost of the
intermediation process itself.
Imperfect substitutability of intermediary and non-intermediary assets
(Premise 1) is supposed to arise because of imperfect information in credit
markets (see Blinder and Stiglitz). Intermediaries specialize in the provision
of credit to borrowers who, because of high screening and monitoring costs,
cannot easily obtain funds by issuing securities on the open market. Because
moral hazard problems prevent intermediaries from credibly conveying the
information they have about their assets, non-intermediaries will purchase
13
There is also some interesting related work on the general functions
of financial intermediation in the real economy. See particularly
Townsend (1983) and Boyd and Prescott (1983).—17—
these assets only at a discount, if at all.'4 Norwill non-intermediaries
often make new intermediary-type loans, both becauseof their cost disadvantage
in making such loans and because of the unfavorablesignal projected by
potential borrowers who have not been able to obtain loans fromintermediaries.
The result is that, if intermediaries become forsome reason unable or
unwilling to make new loans, certain types of borrowersmay find it very
difficult to obtain credit, at least in the shortrun,
That intermediary assets are to some degree nonsubstitutablewith other
assets would seem hard to deny. (See Fama (1985) forsome direct evidence on
this question.) The key issue, which can only beresolved empirically, is one
of degree: If the capacity of some intermediaryor set of intermediaries to
make loans is reduced, how quickly and with whatpremium will alternative
lenders fill the gap? This question is often of directpolicy importance: For
example, it has been debated whether regulations that permitsavings and loans
improved access to sources of funds have any effect on thehousing industry
(Jaffee and Rosen (1979), Hendershott (1981)). The effecton housing will be
larger, the harder it is for builders to find alternativemortgage lenders.
The shocks that may hit the intermediation system (Premise 2)are of
several sorts. Blinder and Stiglitz emphasize the effects ofchanges in
monetary policy (e.g., draining of reserves, changes in reserve requirements).
A second major category of possible shocks is those duedirectly or indirectly
to financial regulation: the disintermediation that occurred when market
interest rates exceeded regulation Q ceilings, the introduction ofmoney market
certificates, changes in regulations concerning portfolio composition, credit
14
New instruments such as mortgage-backed bonds do not invalidate this
statement. These instruments are made feasible only by very high
rates of collateralization and by government and institutional
guarantees against default. See Bernanke and Gertler (1985), p. 38.—18—
controls, usqryceilings,etc. A third type of possibility is changes in the
public demand for intermediary liabilities (e.g., deposits), when these changes
are for some reason (regulatory or otherwise) not easily offset by issuanceof
alternative liabilities (such as certificates of deposit).15 Fourth, we may
treat as shocks financial innovations (e. g., new lending instruments) or
technical changes (computerization) that affect the cost and scope of the
intermediation process.
If we are willing to construe "credit shocks" broadly, there is a fifth
category of shock to include; namely, shocks to the solvency and
creditworthiness of borrowers. Consider an event like the deflation of the
1930s or the combined disinflation and exchange rate appreciation that afflicts
farmers and other exporters in the 1980s. Since the forcing of bankruptcy
proceedings is a punitive measure designed to provide the individual borrower
an incentive for effort ex ante, in an ideal debt contract the probability of
bankruptcy would be independent of the occurrence of events like these which
are clearly out of the borrower's control. Evidently, debt contracts do not
have this property, since bankruptcy rates are sensitive to aggregate phenomena
like the business cycle. When the rate of insolvency is generally high, it
becomes much riskier for intermediaries to make new loans, even for
intrinsically worthwhile projects; a typical response to this situation is for
intermediaries to employ tighter and more costly screening procedures, or to
retreat from new credit extension entirely. Arguably, then, imperfectly
indexed debt contracts and the institution of bankruptcy can lead, under some
15
An extreme example of this last category is financial panics, when
rapid declines in deposits may affect the capacity of intermediaries
to function normally. See Bernanke (1983b).—19—
circumstances, to a lower level of lending and investment then would be
justified by "fundamentals" (e. g., in an Arrow-Debreu economy).16
Together, Premises 1 and 2 imply that "credit shocks" will have real
effects on the economy. For example, a rise in market interest rates above the
regulation Q ceiling may induce a loss of thrift industry deposits and a
decline in mortgage lending. If 1) this decline can not be offset in the short
run by alternative lenders, and 2) if the fall in construction iA not replaced
in the short run by other types of spending, then the resulting fall in
aggregate demand may contribute to a recession.17 Then credit and output will
be correlated for two reasons: first, because of the endogeneity of credit
over the cycle (the dominant effect?); and second, because occasional shocks to
the credit intermediation process have a causal relation with output.
I mentioned that there are also two "auxiliary premises" to the
credit-causes-output story. These are the existence of equilibrium credit
rationing (Jaffee and Russell (1976), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Blinder and
Stiglitz, Blinder (1984a, 1984b), S. King (1984)) and of sticky prices (Blinder
and Stiglitz, Blinder (1984a)). Although many of the cited references treat
these two hypotheses as central, neither is in fact strictly necessary to
motivate real effects of credit shocks. They do, however, help at certain key
points: The existence of credit rationing may explain how credit shocks affect
output without inducing large swings in lenders' interest rates. Sticky prices
16
For an early discussion of the effects of "debt-deflation" on the
economy, see Fisher (1933). Also see Bernanke (1981, 1983b).
I consider the view that the transmission mechanism for credit is
via aggregate demand to be the more plausible. However, aggregate
supply effects are possible; see Blinder (1984a).-20-
may be essential to a model in which open-market operations in particular have
real effects via credit markets.18
Evidence for the Credit-Shock Model. There has been little systematic
empirical work on the relation of credit and output. The cited paper by
Friedman, plus several others he has written, finds the strongest relationship
between credit and output when very broad measures of credit (measures which,
unfortunately, are rather hard to justify theoretically) are used; he finds
much less correlation between output and measures of intermediary credit.19
Particularly damaging to the credit hypothesis are results obtained by S. King
(1984). Using commercial and industrial (CM) loans made by commercial banks
as his measure of credit, King employed standard VAR techniques to show that 1)
credit has little addtional predictive power for GNP when measures of money are
included, but money is a powerful output predicter; and 2) the decomposition of
the forecast variance of output at a four-year horizon shows little role for
credit shocks, while money, again, plays an important role. Observing that
these results obtain in monthly as well as quarterly data, King concluded that
the credit-oriented explanation of the money-income relation has little
empirical support.
18
A possible alternative model motivating real effects of open market
operations, that does not assume a sticky price level, could be
based (I conjecture) on the fact that deposits and loans are set in
nominal terms and on the hypothesis that people adjust nominal
deposit and credit balances only gradually in response to shocks (a
buffer stock model). Note also that if we exclude open market
operations as a source of credit shocks (and there is some evidence
for this given below), this eliminates only one type of shock from
the list that has been offered.
19
Porter and Offenbacher (1983) use VAR techniques to question the
strength of the credit-output relationship for even Friedman's
favored measure of credit. They are careful not to draw structural
inferences, however.—21—
There are two possible problems with King's results. The first is that
his measure of credit is not sufficiently inclusive (indeed, he presents
evidence that "other" commercial bank loans may have more predictive power for
GNP than do C&I loans). The second, discussed below, is the general criticism
of the standard VAR methodology already raised in Section II.
To see if the narrowness of Kingts credit measure was a problem, J
performed a standard VAR analysis using two alternative (more inclusive) credit
variables: the log of total commercial bank loans, in nominal terms (CB), and
the log of the sum of loans made by commercial banks, savings and loans, and
mutual savings banks, also nominal (C). The results were quite similar in the
two cases; I report only the outcomes using C. The other variables in the VAR
were the logs of real Gill' (Y), the GNP deflator (P), real defense spending (G),
20
the monetary base (B), and Ml (N). As a check for robustness, and for other
reasons discussed below, I estimated the VAR system both in log-levels (with a
constant and a trend) and in log-differences, i.e., rates of growth (with a
constant). The data are quarterly, from 1953:1 to 1984:IV; since I allowed
four lags for each variable, the sample begins in 1954:1 for the level data and
1954:11 for the differenced data.21
Results of this exercise are contained in Tables 1, 2, and 3. These
tables tend to confirm King's findings. Table 1 shows that credit is
marginally predicted at the .05 level by real output, defense spending, and Ml;
it marginally predicts no other variable at the .10 level. GNP is predicted at
20The data appendix contains more discussion of data and sources.
Recent research suggests that an interest rate should be included in
this system.I consider this separately in the next section.
21The data were deseasonalized. Inclusion of seasonal dummies, to
allow for possible problems with the deseasonalization procedures,
did not affect the results.Table 1. Tests of Marginal Predictive Power of Row Variables for Column
Variables.
a. Log—Levels, 1954:1 —1984:IV
Y P G B N C
Y .000 .402 .745 .813 .612 .000
P .237 .000 .585 .189 .136 .198
G .012 .169 .000 .862 .612 .020
B .106 .265 .448 .000 .303 .250
N .003 .723 .328 .605 .000 .042
C .196 .781 .261 .877 .830 .000
b. Log—differences, 1954:1 —1984:111
Y P G B N C
Y .000 .289 .584 .708 .282 .001
P .033 .000 .682 .799 .266 .233
G .014 .217 .024 .893 .300 .003
B .139 .011 .848 .018 .904 .059
N .010 .086 .331 .623 .012 .001
C .125 .201 .956 .926 .265 .827
Entry (i,j) is the significance level of the F-test of the hypothesis that 4
lags of variable i can be excluded from the regression predicting variable j. A
low value indicates rejection of this hypothesis.Table 2. Correlation Matrix of Residuals
a. Log—levels, 1954:1 —1984:IV
Y P G B N C
Y 1.00
P .13 1.00
0 .41 -.05 1.00
B .07 .15 -.05 1.00
N .23 .08 .09 .49 1.00
C .49 .23 .06 .04 .12 1.00
b. Log-differences, 1954:11 -1984:IV
Y P G B N C
Y 1.00
P .07 1.00
G .04 -.08 1.00
B —.00 .01 —.27 1.00
M -.19 -.21 -.44 .48 1.00
C .48 .42 -.51 .13 .34 1.00Table 3. Analysis of Dynamics Based on Standard CholeskiDecomposition,
Log—levels, 1954:1 -1984:IV
a. Decomposition of the Variance of Output
Innovation Y P G B M C
to
Quarter!
2 95.8 0.8 0.7 2.1 0.2 0.3 4 79.4 3.7 1.3 2.1 13.0 0.5
8 68.6 14.1 1.9 1.9 12.8 0.8
12 63.3 17.0 1.7 1.6 14.9 1.4
Entriesshow percentage of forecast variance of Y at different horizons
attributable to innovations in column variables. Ordering is as shown.
b. Response of Output to Innovations
Innovation Y P G B N C
to
Qua rter/
1 1.06 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
2 .88 -.13 —.12 .20 .07 -.08
3 .70 —.21 .14 .16 .40 .09
4 .36 —.24 -.08 .02 .50 .06
5 .32 —.30 -.12 .04 .18 —.03 6 .09 -.33 -.13 .06 -.08 -.06
7 —.05 -.35 .00 —.00 -.16 -.06
8 -.18 -.31 —.03 .02 —.12 -.08
9 -.21 —.28 —.01 .04 —.19 -.11
10 -.28 —.25 -.00 .04 —.21 -.11
11 -.31 -.25 .06 .01 —.25 -.10
12 -.32 -.22 .07 .01 —.24 —.09
Entries show the dynamic response of Y to a one-standard-deviation shockin each of
the column variales. Quarter 1 is the contemporaneousquarter. All entries are
multiplied by 10 .—22—
the .01 level by Ml, at slightly worse than the .01 level by defensespending,
and, in the differenced case, at the .05 level by the GNP deflator. Neither
the monetary base nor Ml are marginally predicted byany other variable.(It
is surprising that Ml is not predicted by the base.) In the differenced
version, the base predicts the GNP deflator.
Table 3, which displays results for the log—level case only, is equally
bad news for the credit hypothesis.22 For the ordering shown, shocks toprices
and money explain most of the forecast variance of GNP not explainedby shocks
to GNP itself, at the four-, eight-, and twelve-quarter horizons. (These seem
to me to be the correct horizons to use in a study of the effects ofmoney on
output, rather than the four-year horizon used in most other papers.) Similar
results were obtained for the log-differenced case, and also when creditwas
put before money, or before money and the base, in the ordering of variables.
In the impulse-response function shown in the bottom half of Table 3, shocks to
money are seen to have large effects on output during the first year especially
(the entries in the table may be interpreted as elasticities), while the impact
of credit shocks to output net nearly to zero during the firstyear and become
negative thereafter. The only ray of hope for the credit hypothesis is in
Table 2, which shows that the conditional contemporaneous correlation of credit
with output is higher than that of any other variable with output, in both the
level and differenced versions.
Thus the standard VAR method, as found by King, shows a strong dominance
of money over credit, even when broader measures of credit are used. However,
in Section II above I criticized the standard method, especially the variance
22
Table 3 is based on the Choleski decomposition of the variance
matrix of residuals; that is, it assumes the standard recursive
structure for the model yBy+Au.-23-
decomposition and impulse—response exercises, because of their dependence on
the assumption that the model relating the VAR innovations is recursive.
To test the dependence of the results on this assumption, I estimated the
following illustrative model, in the form of (2.3). G, B, N, C, P, and Y below
refer now to the innovations in each variable as estimated by the same VAR




(3.4) Fl = + + +








Equations (3.1)-(3.6) are in the form yBy+Au, where the 's are elements of B
and is the single non-diagonal element of A. As before, the "structural
disturbances'1 u are assumed to be uncorrelated; this assumption, admittedly
strong, at least allows us to specify the elements of the B matrix in a
relatively unrestricted way.
Equation (3.1) postulates that the innovation to military spending G
within a quarter is a structural disturbance; that is, it is not correlated
with any of the other u's. Note that this assumption, which will be maintained
throughout the paper, does not say that G is uncorrelated with the other
observable variables —B,C, N, etc; quite the contrary. (3.1) is also weaker
than assuming exogeneity of military spending (total spending, not the VAR-24-
innovation), since it puts no restrictions on the behavior of the forecastable
part of the variable.
(3.2) is the monetary authority's reaction function; the monetary base is
permitted to respond within the current quarter to innovations in G, N, P, or
Y.I do not allow the base to respond to innovations in credit, which I think
is descriptively correct; however, the results are unchanged if money is
treated symmetrically and is dropped from (3.2). (3.3) and (3.4) allow nominal
credit and Ml to respond endogenously to within-quarter innovations in the
base, prices, or output. (3.5) is an aggregate supply curve, relating
innovations in prices and output.(3.6) is a reduced form aggregate demand
equation, which relates output to military spending (a major component of
fiscal policy, chosen because it should be relatively exogenous) and which
permits both shocks to real credit and shocks to real money to affect aggregate
demand.
The six structural equations contain fourteen non-zero elements of the
matrix B to be estimated. Since I am able to estimate fifteen non-zero
elements of A and B (plus the six variances of the u's) in a just-identified
6 x 6 system, I am free to specify one more parameter. I use this extra degree
of freedom to add the term a1u5 to (3.6); this has the effect of allowing a
non-zero correlation between the disturbances to the model's two principal
behavioral equations.
Equations (3.1)-(3.6) were jointly estimated by the methods described in
Section II. The results for log-level data are in Table 4a, for
log-differenced data in Table 4b. (It seemed important to estimate the model
both ways, given, recent controversies about the need for differencing time
series models; see, e. g., Mankiw and Shapiro (1985). It is reassuring on this
score that the two sets of estimates are quite similar. The similarity of theTable 4a. Estimated Money-Credit Model; Log-levels
(1)G =
u1
(2) B= -.021G+.146F1-s- .272P+ .060Y+u2







(6)Y = .127G +.439(C-fl -.079(H-P) +.84905 +
(5.09) (2.68) (—0.27) (1.88)
a2 =1.08 =.039 a2 =.061 1
(7.87) (0.92) (5.04)
.042 =.009 a =.068
(2.33) (6.09) (3.91)
Data are in log—levels, quarterly, 1954:1 -1984:IV.
t—statistics are in parentheses.Table 4b. Estimated Money-Credit Model; Log-Differences
(1)G =
u1
(2)B =- .018G+.104M+.269P+.122Y+u2 (—0.73) (0.07) (1.18) (0.29)
(3)C =- .146B +.435P+.019Y +u
(-1.15) (1.15) (0.10)




(6)Y .109 G +.514(C-P) .116 (M-P) -.007
U5+ u6
(4.41) (2.17) (—0.41) (—0.01)
=1.12 =.046 2 =.066 1
(7.84) (0.95) (4.09)
a2 .042 a2 =.008 a =.082
(3.38) (7.57) (5.53)
Data are in log differences, quarterly, 1954:11 -1984:IV.
t-statistics are parentheses-25-
results also reduces concern one might have about heteroskedasticity over time
in the u's.)
A disappointing feature of the estimation outcome is that t-statistics are
generally low; apparently there is a relatively large region of the parameter
space which implies a covariance matrix for the VAR innovations similar to that
found in the data. Nevertheless, there are some interesting results. For
example, while money innovations are positively related to base innovations, as
one would expect, credit is unrelated, if not negatively related, to the base
(equations 3 and 4). This raises the possibility that open market operations
are not particularly important for explaining changes in outstanding credit.
Also, the within-quarter aggregate supply curve (equation 5) appears flat;
there is little relation between innovations to P and innovations to Y. Most
striking, though, are the results for the aggregate demand equation (equation
6): Aggregate demand innovations within a quarter strongly depend on
innovations in G and in real credit; they do not depend at all, or depend
negatively, on innovations to real money. While one should be very cautious in
interpreting these estimates, they certainly do give some encouragement to the
credit view.23
The effect of orthogonalizing via the estimated model (instead of the
recursive model/Choleski decomposition) on the results of the usual exercises
is shown in Table 5. Results for the log—levels specification only are given.
Iuse the expression "innovation to X" as a short-hand for "innovation tothe
23The strong impact of credit in the aggregate demand equation was a
robust finding. For example, (1) exclusion of post—1979 data, (2)
exclusionof post-1973 data, and (3) exclusion of periods in which
regulation Q was binding all tended to raise the t-statistic on the
credit variable, sometimes substantially. The result was also not
affected by the use of nominal rather than real measures of money
and credit.Entries show the dynamic response of Y to a one-standard deviation
estimated equations associated with each of the column varab1es.
contemporaneous quarter. All entries are multiplied by 10
shock in the


















Table 5. Analysis of Dynamics Based on Estimated
1954:1 —1984:IV
Money-CreditModel, Log-levels,
a. Decomposition of the Variance of Output
InnovationY P G B N C
Quarter!
Entries show percentage of forecast variance of Y























1 .86 .25 .44 -.04 -.06 .36
2 .83 -.08 .27 -.16 - .04 .26
3 .55 -.03 .43 -.07 .38 .32
4 .38 -.15 .10 -.07 .47 .21
5 .39 -.22 .06 —.00 .16 .12
6 .21 -.30 —.05 —.06 -.08 -.02
7 —.04 .36 .02 —.02 -.17 -.04
8 —.04 -.35 —.07 —.04 -.12 -.10
9 —.08 .32 —.06 -.07 -.17 -.15
10 —.15 .31 —.09 —.09 -.20 -.17
11 —.20 .31 —.05 —.06 -.24 —.18
12 —.22 .29 —.05 -.06 —.22 —.18
G B N C-26-
equation in Table 4a in which X is the dependent variable." Although this
assignment of innovations to variables to some degree reflects only a
normalization, it seems reasonable to treat, in particular, the innovations to
equations (1)-(4) as representing "own shocks" (i.e., after elimination of the
endogenous component) to G, B, C, and H respectively. Note also that the
results are independent of the ordering of the variables, which is not true in
the standard case.
Table 5 looks rather different from Table 3(which uses the standard
decomposition). The contribution of "Y shocks" to the forecast error in Y
(output) is less--which makes sense, since tly shocks" are now being interpreted
primarily as aggregate demand shocks. Much of this difference is made up by
the greater effect of military spending shocks. Most relevant to thepresent
discussion, credit shocks (which were a minuscule part of forecast error in
Table 3) now make about the same contribution to the variance of the forecast
error in output as do Ml shocks.
In the IR functions, the effect of Ml on output is found to be important
in the third through fifth quarters, much as in Table 3.(Thus, although money
shocks have little contemporaneous effect on output, they remain influential at
a lag of six months to a year.) In strong contrast to Table 3, however, in
Table 5 credit shocks are found to have an immediate strongimpact on output,
with the effect lasting for a year or more.
This analysis suggests two conclusions. First, itappears that credit
shocks are important for output, the inability of the standard VAR methodology
to find this being due to its failure to separate correctly the "truly
exogenous" component of credit Cu3) from its endogenous part.24 Second, the
24 . Notethat this failure also robs the standard Granger causality
tests of Table I of any particular structural meaning.—27—
new estimates do not imply that the credit channel has replaced the monetary
channel; instead, money and credit are parallel forces of approximately equal
importance. Thus the puzzle of the monetary transmission mechanism remains.
A potentially important objection (suggested by the King-Plosser paper)
can be made to the above conclusions, as follows: The model described by
equations (3.1)-(3.6) allows for an endogenous response of money and credit to
contemporaneous shocks in prices and output; however, it does not capture the
possibility that money and credit may also respond to new information
(information not fully described as a function of shocks to current variables)
which agents have about future prices and output. Under this interpretation,
the disturbances from equations (3.3) and (3.4) are better thought of as
measuring this new information, rather than as exogenous shocks to credit and
money. It would thus not be surprising that these estimated disturbances help
forecast output.
It is probably hopeless, in general, to try to use time series methods
(and no further information) to distinguish the hypothesis "X causes Y' from
the hypothesis "Y is exogenous, and K moves in anticipation of movements in V."
Fortunately, recent work on real business cycles suggests some more specific,
and perhaps testable, models. These are considered in the next section.
IV. Real Business Cycles: Money versus Interest Rates
Some very interesting recent papers (see especially Black (1982), Kydland
and Prescott (1982), and Long and Plosser (1983)) have focused attention on the
idea of 1'real business cycles." Real business cycle theory is an attempt to
show that the principal features of cycles (persistence, patterns of
co-movement) can be adequately modelled in a framework of dynamic, competitive
general equilibrium, in which all shocks are taken to be "real" (i.e., to-28—
tastes or technology). In particular, this approach denies that nominal
shocks, e. g., to the money supply, are of any significance in the
determination of real fluctuations.25
Obviously, an important element of the real business cycle research
program is to reconcile the claim that nominal shocks don't matter with the
empirically observed correlations of real and nominal magnitudes——correlations
that are not predicted, for example, by the traditional classical model. From
a theoretical perspective, the best-known recent attempt to achieve this
reconciliation is the previously mentioned work by IL King and Plosser.
Following early antecedents such as Tobin (1971) and Black (1972), King and
Plosser argue that the money-output correlation reflects purely endogenous
changes in money holdings, made in response to changes in current or expected
future output. Although some points of their analysis could be criticized
(e. g. ,thereis no tight explanation of the relation between transaction
services and the level of demand deposits, and the model does not yield a very
strong prediction of price procyclicality) the overall framework is not
implausible.
What is the evidence for the real business cycle (hereafter, RBC) view of
the money-income correlation? King and Plosser document one important fact,
noted earlier by Stephen King (1982), in showing that income is much more
strongly correlated with inside money, or the money multiplier, than with
outside or base money. This is clearly encouraging for real business cycles.
There are some caveats: First, King and Plosser do find a small degree of
correlation between the base and output. Second, in general it should be
25
It is of course not logically necessary to exclude a role for money
shocks from a model dominated by real propagation mechanisms.
Kydland (1983) integrates the two approaches.-29-
recognized that the lack of correlation does not rule out a causal link. For
example, iftheFed is attempting to use the base to stabilize the economy,
thismay complicate the interpretation of the time series relationship between
26
thebase and output.
A second piece of favorable evidence, to which I will give a good deal of
attention, was documented by Sims (198Gb), following some earlier work by Mehra
(1978). Using monthly data, Sims showed that the addition of a short-term
nominal interest rate (the rate on 4-6 month prime commercial paper) to a VAR
systemalso including industrial production, wholesale prices, and Ml, had the
effect of virtually eliminating the marginal predictive power of money for
output (i.e., industrial production), at least for the postwar period.27 The
interest rate, in contrast, has significant predictive power for output in the
four-variable system, a positive innovation in interest rates being followed
about six months later by a smooth decline in output.
Sims' own interpretation of this finding was in the spirit of the REC
approach.His theory is that interest rate innovations reflect primarily new
information about future profitability. A decline in expected future
26An example, based on a comment in Sims (1972), is as follows:
Assume a pure monetarist model, where output depends on inside money
and a forecastable error, and where money depends on the base plus a
forecastable error. The base is set one period in advance. If the
base is set to minimize the variance of output, then output and
inside money will be correlated with each other, but both output and
inside money will be uncorrelated with current and lagged values of
the base. (However, output and inside money will predict future
values of the base.) With imperfect optimization or partial
endogeneity of the base, the time series relation of output and the
base could be complex. See Buiter (1984) for an extensive analysis.
27Money retained its predictive power for output in the interwar
sample. Because of the importance of financial panics and
international capital movements during the interwar, Sims argued,
however, that this finding has little relevance for contemporary
macroeconomic analysis.-30-
profitability, given current profitability, lowers the prices of capital assets
and raises current yields. If people are onaverage correct in their
expectations, then an innovation to interest rates will be followed sometime
later by a decline in the economy, as found in the data. The behavior ofthe
money stock reflects a fall in money demand in anticipation of lower output, as
in the King-Plosser story. The leading behavior of interestrates (and money,
28 in a three-variable system) are expectational, not causal, phenomena.
A recent paper by Litterman and Weiss (1985) reinterprets the Simsfinding
somewhat, but in a way also consistent with the RBC approach. Litterman and
Weiss present evidence that (1) the real interest rate isexogenous, i.e., it
evolves without feedback from other macro variables, and (2) theimportant part
of the nominal interest rate, for thepurposes of forecasting output, is the
expected inflation component, not the real interest rate component. As in the
Sims example, interest rates here lead output not forany causal reason but
because interest rates embody information currently available tothe public
about future output movements. (In the specific modelpresented by Litterman
and Weiss, the negative relationship between nominal interestrates and future
output arises because lower future output leads, via the money demand function
and given the money supply process, to higher futureprices and higher expected
inflation today.)
These findings suggest29 a particular variant of the RBCexplanation of
the money-income relation: I.e,, that not only is the leadrelation of money
to output due simply to the response of money demand tonew information about
28
A closely related and somewhat more formal analysis of the role of
interest rates in the explanation of money-income-price correlations
is contained in King and Plosser.
29
. Butsee NcCalluni (1983) for an opposing view.-3'- 4
futureoutput; but that all of this new information is contained in nominal
interest rates. The evidence of Sims and of Litterman-Weiss favors this view;
below, I use the alternative VAR methodology of this paper to reconsider it.
First, though, I present some evidence from the standard VARapproach.
Evidence. Tables 6 through 8 give the results of a standard Sims-type
analysis of a six-variable system including real GNP (Y), the GNP deflator (P),
military spending (G), the monetary base (B), the Ml measure of the money
supply (M), and the (end-of-quarter, prospective) nominal return on three-month
Treasury bills, as in Huizinga and frlishkin (1984) (R). This is the same as the
system studied in Section II, with the interest rate replacing the credit
measure. As before, I estimate one set of equations in log—levels (with a
constant and trend term) and a second in log-differences (with a constant).
Due to data availability, here the last quarter in the sample is 1984:111.
Most noteworthy about my results is that I do not obtain the outcome that
inclusion of the nominal interest rate eliminates the predictive power of money
for output. In Table 6, interest rates appear to forecast money and prices
well; but the F-statistic for the hypothesis that interest rates marginally
predict output is lower than the corresponding statistic for every variable
except prices in the log-level specification, and for every variable in the
log-differences specification. In particular, money predicts output at the .01
significance level in both specifications.
The variance decomposition exercise for output (Table 8a), which uses the
standard Choleski decomposition, tells a similar story. While base shocks do
not appear important, money shocks explain a significant fraction of the
forecast variance of output at the 4-, 8-, and 12-quarter horizons. Interest
rate shocks explain relatively less. (The relative contributions of N and R
shocks to the variance of Y are the same if N and R are interchanged in theTable 6. Tests of Marginal Predictive Power of Row Variables for Column Variables
a. Log—levels, 1954:1 —1984:111
Y P G B H R
Y .000 .787 .437 .169 .141 .019
P .618 .000 .409 .856 .566 .001
G .021 .067 .000 .697 .409 .507
B .068 .190 .470 .000 .889 .003
H .007 .407 .237 .305 .000 .004
R .078 .021 .844 .290 .001 .000
b. Log—differences, 1954:11 —1984:111
Y P C B N R
Y .001 .107 .293 .488 .374 .038
P .004 .000 .270 .916 .939 .008
G .005 .117 .000 .934 .477 .788
B .021 .062 .897 .006 .705 .068
H .003 .526 .132 .342 .000 .002
R .952 .001 .425 .211 .000 .000
Entry (i,j) is the significance level of the F—test of the hypothesis that 4 lags
of variablecan be excluded from the regression predicting variable j. A low
value indicates rejection of this hypothesis.Table 7. Correlation Matrix of Residuals
a. Log—levels, 1954:1 —1984:111
Y P G B M R
Y 1.00
P .11 1.00
G .39 .00 1.00
B .10 .22 —.05 1.00
H .34 .25 .03 .50 1.00
R .36 .12 .16 .08 .17 1.00
b. Log—differences, 1954:11 -1984:111
Y P G B N R
y 1.00
P .14 1.00
G .27 -.01 1.00
B .08 .16 .01 1.00
H .27 .24 .05 .56 1.00
R .29 .11 .09 .10 .21 1.00Table 8. Analysis of Dynamics Based on Standard Choleski Decomposition,
Log—levels, 1954:1 —1984:111
a. Decomposition of the Variance of Output
Innovation Y P G B N R
to
Quarter!
2 96.1 0.2 0.8 1.1 0.3 1.5
4 82.4 0.5 1.9 1.2 11.6 2.4
8 63.8 10.9 2.2 1.1 12.1 9.9
12 54.6 16.3 2.2 0.9 15.1 10.9
Entriesshow percentage of forecast variance of Yatdifferent horizons
attributable to innovations in column variables. Ordering is as shown.
b. Response of Output to Innovations
Innovation Y P G B N R
to
Quarter
1 1.05 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
2 .83 —.06 —.12 .14 .07 .17
3 .66 —.06 .07 .03 .39 .08
4 .36 —.08 -.19 -.11 .42 —.18
5 .31 —.23 —.14 -.08 .16 —.37
6 .12 -.32 —.09 .02 —.04 -.29
7 .03 -.38 .04 —.03 —.23 -.21
8 -.10 -.33 .03 —.01 —.24 '-.22
9 —.16 —.32 .09 .01 —.24 —.25
10 —.22 -.32 .05 .04 —.23 —.19
11 -.24 -.32 .09 .03 -.29 —.18
12 -.30 —.28 .08 .04 -.28 —.15
Entries show the dynamic response of Y to a one-standard-deviation shock in each of
the column varia?les. Quarter 1 is the contemporaneous quarter. All entries are
multiplied by 10 .-32-
ordering.) In the estimated impulse-response patterns (Table 8b), money shocks
are followed by relatively large output changes of the same sign at the 3- to
5-quarter horizon. The response of output to an. interest rate shock exhibits a
pattern similar to that found by Sims and by Litterman and Weiss.
The reason that I failed to obtain the result that inclusion of nominal
interest rates eliminates the effect of money on output, it turns out, is that
30
I included a trend term, while the previous authors did not. As S. King
(1982) and Runkle (1985) have already noted, adding a trend significantly
enhances the estimated role for money in predicting output. This was clearly
the case in my data.31 Since I put in the trend term in the first place in the
hope of minimizing conditional heteroskedasticity (which is particularly
problematic for my estimation method), and since I know of no compelling
theoretical argument to take it out, I retain the trend in the principal
estimates reported below. However, I also discuss the effects of eliminating
the trend.
The above results follow from the standard VAR approach. As was shown in
the previous section, however, the interpretation of VARs through a structural
30The principal results of both Sims and Litterinan-Weiss are obtained
from VARs using data in log-levels and including a constant, but no
trend. Litterman and Weiss also report the effect of adding trend
and trend-squared (footnote 4, p. 132). Although they characterize
this as leaving their decomposition results "essentially unchanged",
the percentage of output variance explained by Ml at 24 quarters
rises from 7.2% to 19.4%.
31With no trend, standard analysis of my six-variable system ascribes
46% of the variance of output at twelve quarters to interest rate
shocks, and only 6% of this variance to money shocks. This is
similar to the Sims/Litterman-Weiss finding. More favorable, among
the no-trend results, to the view that money matters are that:1)
At four quarters, money explains 10% of the forecast variance of
output, to a bit over 4% for interest rates. 2) The marginal
predictive power of money for output is significant at the .006
level, compared to the .040 level for interest rates.-33—
model of the innovations (the Blanchard-Watson methodology) can give
appreciably different results from the standard approach. To explore this in
the present case, I used the methods described above to estimate the following
"real business cycle" model, suggested by a similar model in Litterman-Weiss.
As in the model in Section III, G, B, R, N, P, and Y are now the innovations
from a first-stage VAR (in log—levels) of a system including militaryspending,
the monetary base, the nominal 3-month treasury bill interestrate, the Ni
money stock, the GNP deflator; and real GNP (plus constant and trend).












(4.6) = + a2u5÷
Equations (4.1)-(4.6) require some explanation. Equation (4.1)says that
innovations to military spending are not caused by innovations to other
variables within the quarter, as before. (4.2) is a policy reaction function
that relates innovations in the base to innovations in all the othervariables;
is the "own shock" to the base.-34-
Equation (4.3), which specifies how the innovation to the nominal interest
rate is determined, is important for the interpretation of the model.
To motivate (4.3), write the innovation to (the log of one plus) the nominal
interest rate, as
(4.7) R r
t t t t
where r is the innovation to (the log of one plus) the real interest and P is
the innovation to (the log of) the price level. P is the innovation, between
t-l and t, in the expectation of the log of the price level as of t+l.
Now decompose P as
(4.8) e +
where is the innovation to the expectation of the price level in t+1
knowable given only the variables in the VAR at time t, while Vt represents all
additional new information about available to agents t. Note that the
series is directly computable using the first-stage prediction equation for
P; it is just the estimated coefficient on the first lag of each of the
right-hand-side variables times the innovations to each of these variables in
t. Thus (4.8) breaks up the innovation in the expected price level into a part
observable by the econometrician and a part that is unobservable.
Next we must model the process generating the real interest rate
innovation, r. One possibility would be to follow Litterman-Weiss exactly,
and to treat r as strictly autonomous, i.e., we could write
(4.9) r =-35-
where w is a white noise process uncorrelated withany of the other structural
disturbances in t. Equation (4.3) could then be written
(4.3) R =(e-P)+ u3
where
(4.10) u3 v +
Rather than adopt (4.3Y, however, I allow for the possibility that
contemporaneous real shocks might influence the real interest rate
innovation.32 Specifically, Iassume
(4.11) r=6G+ct1u6+w
thus shocks to real military spending (G) and to realoutput (u6, see below),
are allowed to affect r, as well as the own shock w. Together with (4.7) and
(4.8), (4.11) implies (4.3), withu3 still defined as in (4.10). Note that, as
G and u6 are both primitive real shocks, uncorrelated with otherdisturbances,
(4.3) embodies the critical Litterinan-Weiss property that the real interest
rate innovation is independent of any nominal disturbance. Note also that,
under the variant of the RBC model being considered, the disturbanceu3 in
(4.3) should embody a great deal of information about future output. Indeed,
under the strongest form of the Sims/Litterman-Weiss hypothesis,given u3 and
32 . . - Atechnical reason for not adopting (4.3) is that in a model
including (4.1), adding (4.3)' would violate the rank condition for
identification.-36-
all real disturbances, nominal disturbances should have no additional
predictive power for real output.33
To complete the model specification:(4.4) is a money supply equation
that allows the quantity of Ml to depend on the base, interest rates, prices,
output, and an own shock u4.(4.5) is the money market equilibrium equation
written with P on the left-hand side.(4.6) is a reduced—form equation for
real output. The term a2u5 in (4.6) allows (analogously to the previous
section) for a non-zero covariance between errors to the money market
equilibrium and output equations.34 (I allow output to depend on the money
demand shock in order to give the model a better chance to fit the data, and
because, given the King-Plosser framework, money demand shocks may properly be
thought of as shocks to tastes or technology, i.e., real shocks.)
Equations (4.1)—(4.6), it should be repeated, form a real business cycle
model, with these features: The real interest rate innovation depends only on
real shocks (to military spending and to real output) and an own shock.
Expected inflation, which forms part of the nominal interest rate, depends in
part on new information not observable by the econometrician. Real output
innovations depend on shocks to military spending and to money demand, and on
an own shock. The price level adjusts flexibly to balance money supply and
money demand, given output and nominal interest rates. Last, but very
important, in this model the correlations of innovations in inside money and
It would be interesting from this point of view to break up the
predictive power of u into that attributable to v and that
attributable to w. nfortunate1y this decomposition is not
identified.
The real interest rate should appear in (4.6). However, given that
wecannot isolate the real and expected-inflation components of the
composite disturbance u3, the coefficient of the realrate (4.6) is
notidentifiable. The otherestimated coefficients in (4.6) should
beinterpreted as reflecting thisspecification bias.-37—
the base with those in real output are explained entirely by the endogenous
response of H and B to output, prices, and interest rates; the own shocks to
the base and to money, u2 and u4, have zero contemporaneous effect on output or
real interest rates.
Estimates of the model for the log-level specification are given in Table
9a, for the log-differenced specification in Table 9b. The results are similar
in the two specifications and are on the whole reasonable, although again
standard errors are large. Interest rates appear to be influenced positively
both by military spending and, rather strongly, by real output shocks. Output
depends positively on military spending and negatively on shocks to the price
determination equation. The base reaction function is very imprecisely
estimated; inside money depends primarily on the base and, to a lesser extent,
on output.
The money market equilibrium equation is estimated imprecisely, and with
the wrong sign for the nominal interest rate. Interestingly, when I tried
estimating the system using the beginning-of-quarter rather than the
(theoretically correct) end—of-quarter interest rate, this equation was
estimated with the right signs and high t-statistics. No subsequent
conclusions were affected by the use of alternative timing convention, however.
I also estimated the real business cycle model dropping first post-1979,
then post-1973 data. The qualitative features of the estimates and of the
implied dynamics were not much changed.
An analysis of the system's dynamics, interpreted via the structural model
in Table9a rather than by an assumed recursive structure, is given in Table
10.Again,"innovation to X" is short-band for "innovation to the error term
co;respondingto the equation for which X is the dependent variable."Table 9a. Estimated Real Business Cycle Model; Log-levels
(1)G =




(4)N =1.65B .019R -2.18P+.187Y+u4




(6)Y =.123G .383 a5 +a6
(4.70) (—1.60)




=.118 cr2 =.045 cr =.086
(2.56) (5.37) (5.34)
Data are in log-levels, quarterly, 1954:1 -1984:111.
t-statistics are in parentheses.Table 9b. Estimated Real Business Cycle Model; Log-differences.
(1)0 =
u1
(2)B =.0800÷ -1.64R + 2.11?!+13.SP-.OS1Y+u






(1.76) (—0.09) (0.07) (0.50)
(5)P =-.044R+1.0?!-.O11Y+u
(—0.35) (—0.47)
(6)Y=.087G .045 u5 +
(3.11) (—0.09)
=1.06 a =1.82 =.058
(7.81) (0.05) (8.00)




Data are in log—differences, quarterly, 1954:11 -1984:111.
t-statistics are in parentheses.Innovation Y
to
Quarterj
P G B N R
Table 10. Analysis of Dynamics Based on Estimated Real BusinessCycle Model,
Log-levels, 1954:1 -1984:111
a. Decomposition of the Variance of Output
2 76.8 9.2 11.5 0.0 0.5 1.9 4 60.7 21.4 11.2 1.0 3.3 2.5 8 47.0 19.0 8.4 8.5 7.5 9.7
12 40.6 17.4 6.6 10.6 13.6 11.2
Entries show percentage of forecast variance of Y at different horizons
attributable to innovations in estimated equations associated with each of the
column variables.
b. Response of Output to Innovations
Quarter!
Studies show the dynamics response of Y to a one-standard deviation shock in the
estimated equations associated with each of the columnvarables. Quarter 1 is























































































There are a number of interesting differences between Table 10 and Table
8, which uses the standard decomposition; e.g., the results in Table 10 give
military spending a bigger role in determining output. However, for assessing
the variant of the REC hypothesis under consideration, the most important
findings concern the effects of base and inside money shocks on output. Recall
that, as the model is estimated, base and money shocks are measured net of any
contemporaneous endogenous response to prices or output; moreover, by
construction, the own shocks to the base and the money Cu2, u4) are orthogonal
to the nominal interest rate disturbance (u3). The real business cycle
hypothesis would therefore predict that the constructed money and base shocks
should not contribute to the forecast variance of real output. In fact, they
do; at the 8-quarter horizonu2 and u4 explain a total of 16.0% of the
variance of the forecast error for output, and they explain 24.2% of the
variance at twelve quarters.(The corresponding percentages for the nominal
interest rate shock,u3, are 9.7% and 11.2%.) Moreover, the explanatory power
of shocks to the base is similar to that of shocks to money, in contrast to the
result in Table 8.
The dynamic response of output to base and money shocks (Table lOb)
weakens the case for money a bit: Ml shocks still positively affect output at
the 3-4 quarter horizon, bat the effect is less pronounced than in Table 8.
Base shocks have a primarily negative effect on output, after a small short-run
positive effect. (The effect of base shocks on output might be explainable in
a combined monetarist-RBC model in which the authorities manipulate the base to
try to dampen expected future output changes.)
For comparison, I also did the above analysis for the no-trend case.
(Recall that omitting the trend produced much more favorable results to the RBC
hypothesis in the standard VARanalysis.)The implied contemporaneous—39—
correlations -of the residuals, and thus the estimatedmodel, were very similar
to the with-trend case, and so are not reported.However, the dynamic analysis
looked rather different (see Table ii).
With no trend, the results are very much like whatwas found by Sims and
Litterman-Weiss (even though here the orthogonalization ofthe VAR residuals
was done via an estimated structural model). Hoststriking is the finding that
interest rate innovations explain 47.0% of the variance ofoutput at twelve
quarters, compared to 1.7% for £41.(The base does a little better than Ml,
explaining 7.7% of the output variance at twelve quarters.)
Even in this best case for the RBC hypothesis,however, I think some
argument can be made for a role for money. Looking at theimpulse-response
functions, one can see that Hi shocks still have an important effecton output
at the 3- to 5-quarter horizon. The reason for the dominance ofinterest rate
shocks at longer horizons appears to be that the effects ofinterest rate
shocksare "permanent", while the effects of money on output are estimated to
dieaway quickly. But the transitory nature of the real effects of monetary
shocks does not contradict the received view thatmoney works through temporary
real-nominal confusion. We might imagine, therefore, thatmoney shocks are a
source of temporary aggregate demand variation, while interest rate shocks
signal future productivity changes, which are essentiallypermanent. (The
response of output to its own shock in Table lib seems quite consistent with
the view that real shocks are largely permanent.) This allowssome scope for
money, while acknowledging that the real shocks emphasized in RBC models may be
extremelyimportant.
Overall, the particular variant of the RBCwehave been considering does
notappear to fit the facts completely. Again, this does not rule out a less
restrictive RBC model in which the own shocks to basemoney and Mi also areTable 11. Analysis of Dynamics Based on Estimated Real Business Cycle Model,
Log-levels, 1954:1 -1984:111;no trend.
a. Decomposition of the Variance of Output
Innovation Y P G B M R
to
Quarter!
2 82.4 8.4 8.4 0.0 0.5 0.3
4 65.2 19.2 7.2 0.9 4.1 3.3
8 45.1 11.3 3.7 6.7 2.5 30.7
12 34.4 6.9 2.3 7.7 1.7 47.0
Entries showpercentage of forecast variance of Y at different horizons
attributableto innovations in estimated equations associated with each of the
columnvariables.
b. Response of Output to Innovations
InnovationY P G B N R
to
Quarter!
1 .98 —.24 .37 .00 .00 .00
2 .84 —.33 .17 —.00 —.10 .08
3 .59 —.51 .26 -.07 .18 -.03
4 .46 —.48 -.10 —.17 .31 —.33
5 .57 —.34 —.06 —.28 .10 —.63
6 .51 —.20 —.10 —.31 —.10 —.70
7 .48 —.02 —.03 -.39 —.13 —.73
8 .43 —.01 —.08 —.35 —.08 —.81
9 .46 —.01 —.02 -.34 —.07 -.89
10 .46 —.01 —.05 —.32 —.08 -.88
11 .45 .04 —.02 —.33 —.06 -.92
12 .42 .06 —.05 —.30 —.05 -.94
Studies show the dynamics response of Y to a one-standard deviation shock in the
estimated equations associated with each of the column varables. Quarter I is the
contemporaneous quarter. All entries are multiplied by 10-40-
interpreted as reflecting information about future output, independent of that
found in nominal interest rates. However, such a model is difficult to
distinguish without further information from a "money matters" model, and I do
not attempt it here.
V. Conclusion
This paper has used an alternative VAR methodology, based on work of
Blanchard and Watson, consider two alternative explanations of the money-income
correlation: the "credit view" and a variant of the real business cycle
hypothesis. The two alternatives are treated asymmetrically, since the
hypotheses considered are (1) that credit shocks explain nothing and (2) that
real effects explain everything. Evidence is found against both hypotheses
(although in case (2) the strength of the evidence depends a great deal on
one's views about the use of trends). It seems likely that a complete macro
model must allow for all three sorts of influences--credit market, real, and
monetary--in order to explain the data. For policy-makers, the conservative
course is to continue to use care to avoid destabilizing shocks to credit
markets and to the money supply.
Because the methodology is relatively untested and because there is room
for disagreement about model specification, the results of this paper about
specific hypotheses should be considered tentative. The paper does
demonstrate, however, that the structural interpretation of VARs can be very
sensitive to the model that one assumes (implicitly or explicitly) is relating
contemporaneous residuals. Further applications of the VAR methodology should
take this into account.-41-
Data Appendix
Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and cover the period 1953:1 to 1984:IV
(except for the interest rate, which was available up to 1984:111). As
described in the text, in the estimation all variables were in log-level or
log-differenced form.
Real GNP(Y),the GNP price deflator (F), and real defense spending (G) are
from NIPA. The Ml money stock (H) and the monetary base (B) series for 1959:1
on were provided by the Federal Reserve; H corresponds to the average Ml stock
over the last month of the quarter, B to the monetary base recorded during the
last week of the quarter. For 1953:1 to 1958:IV, the quarterly series for Ml
and the monetary base from Banking and Monetary Statistics were spliced to the
post-1958 series. The credit variable (C) is the sum of commercial bank loans,
mortgages held by S&Ls, and mortgages plus "other loans" held by mutual savings
banks, all for the last month of the quarter and all from the
Federal Reserve Bulletin. The nominal interest rate (R) is the three-month
prospective Treasury bill rate at the end of the quarter (actually, for the
first day of the next quarter), as computed from U.S. Treasury bill prices
obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at the
University of Chicago. I thank Frederic Mishkin for providing the interest
rate data and for useful advice.REFERENCES
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